“卡脖子”這個說法很形象，借用核心技術(shù)就是說這個技術(shù)很重要，在項目和產(chǎn)品中，“卡脖子”技術(shù)的重要性不言而喻。 我們常用的計算機核心芯片、高端手機核心芯片、存儲器件、視頻系統(tǒng)顯示驅(qū)動芯片、數(shù)字信號處理器件芯片、可編程邏輯器件核心芯片，都是中國無法自主生產(chǎn)的高端芯片。 在這些產(chǎn)品中，中國自主芯片依賴進口，全球市場份額不到1%，甚至大部分不到0.5%。

這樣的現(xiàn)狀下，高端芯片自然就成了“卡脖子”問題，原因是極大的需求量和極低的自供給量，所以美國制裁華為，殺手锏就是芯片。近期在美版知乎論壇上就有這樣的一個話題引起各國網(wǎng)友的熱議：“美國向荷蘭施壓，阻止荷蘭ASML公司向中芯國際出售EUV設(shè)備，最終影響了中國的技術(shù)夢”。美國能壓制中國芯片發(fā)展多久?

讓我們也來看看國外民間網(wǎng)友對這個問題的的觀點吧！

荷蘭半導(dǎo)體工程師的觀點

I think I am the perfect person to answer this. I have been working in the semiconductor industry for years, currently living in the Netherlands, lived and worked in China for 3 years, I know a lot of engineers from ASML (expecially after they hired hundreds of Turkish engineers).

我認為我是回答這個問題的[敏感詞]人選。我在半導(dǎo)體行業(yè)工作多年，目前生活在荷蘭，在中國生活和工作了3年，我認識很多來自ASML的工程師(特別是他們雇傭了數(shù)百名土耳其工程師后)。

Let me tell you something: High-end semiconductor manufacturing is black magic. Both the processes and tools used for it are very complex. ASML’s EUV lithography machine is probably the most complex tool humankind ever developed since it stopped jumping between trees. It took billions of Euros and decades of experience to perfect it. Other experienced lithography machine suppliers failed at it. China has no experience in high-end semiconductor manufacturing tools with the exception of one-off/few-off prototypes.

讓我告訴你:高端半導(dǎo)體制造是一種黑魔法。它所使用的過程和工具都非常復(fù)雜。ASML的EUV光刻機可能是人類發(fā)明的最復(fù)雜的工具，因為它不再在樹之間跳躍。它花費了數(shù)十億歐元和幾十年的經(jīng)驗來完善它。其他經(jīng)驗豐富的光刻機供應(yīng)商在這方面失敗了。中國在高端半導(dǎo)體制造工具方面沒有經(jīng)驗，除了一次性或少量的原型。

ASML’s EUV lithography machine. Needs 41 semi-trucks to get transported, costs $150 million, has 100.000 major parts, has mirrors that need months of grinding to reach needed smoothness, needs multiple people with PhD’s as machine operators. Quite high-tech. Isn’t it?

ASML公司的EUV光刻機。運輸需要41輛半卡車，耗資1.5億美元，有10萬個主要部件，鏡子需要數(shù)月的打磨才能達到所需的光滑程度，需要多名擁有博士學(xué)位的人作為機器操作員。很高科技。不是嗎?

EUV光刻機

Unfortunately, ASML is a very convenient target for the USA. The company uses a lot of critical parts from the USA but those parts don’t represent anything significant in the US economy in terms of their monetary value. Chinese electronics industry still depends on foreign chips so it can not threaten fabs with banning the sale of chips in China that were manufactured using ASML tools. Also, China isn’t a big customer of ASML too. In short, China can not answer with reciprocal sanctions.

不幸的是，ASML對美國來說是一個非常方便的目標(biāo)。該公司使用了許多來自美國的關(guān)鍵部件，但這些部件的貨幣價值在美國經(jīng)濟中并不代表任何重要的東西。中國電子行業(yè)仍依賴外國芯片，因此無法通過禁止在中國銷售使用ASML工具生產(chǎn)的芯片來威脅晶片廠。此外，中國也不是阿斯麥的大客戶?？傊袊荒芤詫Φ戎撇米鳛榛貞?yīng)。

Is China hopeless? No.

中國絕望了? 不！

1- All of those tools are engineered and made by humans, and the laws of physics are the same both in the Netherlands and China. If the Netherlands could, then there is no reason for anybody else to fail with the correct approach.

1-所有這些工具都是由人類設(shè)計和制造的，而且物理定律在荷蘭和中國都是相同的。如果荷蘭可以，那么其他國家就沒有理由用正確的方法失敗。

2- China is filthy rich compared to the Netherlands. Chinese economy is 17x of the Netherlands’, 9x of SK’s, 27x of Taiwan’s, 3+x of Japan’s. With state support, Chinese fabs and tool makers can hire the top people from the rest of the world with salaries ASML, LamResearch, AM, Synopsys, TSMC, Samsung, … simply can not compete with. A significant portion of these companies’ employees are expats anyway, most of them are just after money.

2、中國比荷蘭富得流油。中國經(jīng)濟是荷蘭的17倍，SK的9倍，臺灣的27倍，日本的3倍。在國家的支持下，中國的晶圓廠和工具制造商可以用ASML、LamResearch、AM、Synopsys、臺積電、三星等公司無法與之競爭的薪水從世界其他地方雇傭[敏感詞]人才。這些公司的員工中有很大一部分是外國人，他們中的大多數(shù)只是為了錢。

In fact China is already doing this successfully with good results. For example, it already has a working EUV lithography machine prototype, already caught up with the rest in chip testing, packaging, wafer production, also its first immersion lithography machine (good enough for most things) is getting prepared for commercial use.

事實上，中國已經(jīng)成功地做到了這一點，并取得了良好的成果。例如，它已經(jīng)有了一臺工作中的EUV光刻機原型，在芯片測試、封裝、晶圓生產(chǎn)方面已經(jīng)趕上了其他公司，同時它的[敏感詞]臺浸沒式光刻機(對大多數(shù)事情來說已經(jīng)足夠好了)也準(zhǔn)備投入商業(yè)使用。

3- China is a scientific powerhouse on its own. It is the country with most patent applications, most research output, graduates more STEM students than any other country, 2nd largest R&D spender, has 11 universities in top 100. This leads us to my first point. If the Netherlands could, so can China if given enough time.

中國本身就是一個科學(xué)強國。它是專利申請最多、研究產(chǎn)出最多的國家，STEM專業(yè)的畢業(yè)生比其他任何國家都多，研發(fā)支出排名第二，有11所大學(xué)進入前100名。這就引出了我的[敏感詞]點。如果荷蘭可以，那么只要給中國足夠的時間，中國也可以。

4- Catching up is much easier than innovating. Knowing something is possible and having a general knowledge of how it works make things much easier.

趕超比創(chuàng)新容易得多。知道某件事是可能的，并且對它的工作原理有一個大致的了解會讓事情變得容易得多。

5- Time is on the Chinese side. Technology of semiconductors is close to maturity/stalling (choose the word depending on your view). If the development slows (which it does) it gives China the opportunity to catch-up. If a tech revolution happens, then the playing field evens out anyway.

5-時間在中國這邊。半導(dǎo)體技術(shù)接近成熟/停滯(根據(jù)你的觀點選擇這個詞)。如果發(fā)展放緩(確實如此)，中國就有機會迎頭趕上。如果科技革命發(fā)生了，那么競爭環(huán)境無論如何都是公平的。

6- You don’t need EUV for the most things. You don’t even need high-end processes for the most things. There is more to semiconductors than the latest smartphone processors, GPUs, and CPUs. Look at iPhone 12 teardown videos. You will see a lot of chips. Only one of them needs EUV. An average modern car has 250+ computers inside. That means thousands of chips. All of them are manufactured using old processes. This is even more true for military and space applications. Those use very old chips that are known to be reliable and secure.

6-大多數(shù)事情都不需要EUV。大多數(shù)事情你甚至不需要高端的流程。半導(dǎo)體不僅僅是[敏感詞]的智能手機處理器、圖形處理器(gpu)和cpu?？纯磇Phone 12拆卸的視頻。你會看到很多芯片。只有一個需要EUV。一輛普通的現(xiàn)代汽車內(nèi)部有250臺電腦。這意味著成千上萬的芯片。所有這些都是用舊工藝制造的。在[敏感詞]和太空應(yīng)用方面更是如此。它們使用的是非常老舊的芯片，但已知是可靠和安全的。

Conclusion: Blocking ASML from selling EUV machines to China can hurt Chinese businesses for some time but in the grand scheme it is insignificant. The USA needs to run faster rather than keep trying to block China if it wants to preserve its dominance in tech.

結(jié)論:阻止ASML向中國銷售EUV設(shè)備可能會在一段時間內(nèi)傷害中國企業(yè)，但從長遠來看，這是微不足道的。如果美國想要保持其在科技領(lǐng)域的主導(dǎo)地位，它需要跑得更快，而不是一直試圖阻止中國。

An update on the Chinese EUV light source: New Options for Synchrotron Light Sources

中國極紫外光源的更新:同步加速器光源的新選擇

It seems the basic research is complete and the method completely different than of ASML’s.

看來基礎(chǔ)研究已經(jīng)完成，方法和ASML的完全不同。

德國網(wǎng)友的觀點

This EUV thing has been adopted into China’s 14th 5-year plan which has been started since this year. And for the record, China has never missed a single deadline for the past 13 5-year plans. So it’s safe to say that China will have this thing by 2026. So speaking of the US resisting China’s development, it would be 4 more years for this particular item.

EUV項目已被納入今年啟動的中國第14個五年計劃。根據(jù)記錄，在過去的13個五年計劃中，中國從未錯過任何一個最后期限。所以可以肯定地說，中國將在2026年擁有它。所以說到美國抵制中國的發(fā)展，這個項目還需要4年。

And the good thing for China having the EUV equipment is that the price of the equipment will be significantly dropped. So I guess that would be a benefit of the entire world.

中國擁有EUV設(shè)備的好處是，設(shè)備的價格將大幅下降。所以我想這對整個世界都有好處。

America is ALREADY behind China in so MANY aspects and they are still denying and avoiding the thought that America might one day second to China. That frightens many Americans.

美國在很多方面已經(jīng)落后于中國了，他們還在否認和避免美國有一天會落后于中國的想法。這讓許多美國人感到害怕。

No matter how ineffective many of the counter-China measures, e.g. trade war, Americans have and are to put in place, they will keep doing the same things and getting themselves hurt before China does.

無論許多繁華措施有多無效，例如貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，美國人已經(jīng)并將付諸實施，他們將繼續(xù)做同樣的事情，他們會主動出擊而不是等待中國超越他們。

The Chinese are the most industrious race on earth.

中國人是世界上最勤勞的民族。

Necessity is the mother of Invention.

需求是發(fā)明之母

The Chinese will find a way. The more you suppress them and the more you try to deny them the technology - they will begin to make it on their own and they will slowly do better and better.

中國人會找到辦法的。你越是壓制他們，你越是試圖否認他們的技術(shù)，他們就會開始自己創(chuàng)造，慢慢地做得越來越好。

Chips is the best example.

芯片就是[敏感詞]的例子。

As long as Taiwan kept supplying them the chips - The Chinese were happy. They focused on other things

只要臺積電繼續(xù)向他們供應(yīng)芯片——中國人就很高興。然后會他們專注于其他事情。

江蘇南京的臺積電工廠

The Minute Trump decided to threaten the Chinese - they decided to get their act together and start making their own chips. They will start with inferior ones but in 10 years - they will outmanufacture Taiwan at 1/3 the cost and take away the market.

特朗普決定威脅他們那一刻起，他們就會齊心協(xié)力開始制作自己的芯片。他們一開始會用劣質(zhì)產(chǎn)品，但10年后，他們的生產(chǎn)成本將是臺積電的三分之一，并奪走市場

And the businessmen will say - “Uigyurs???? Who gives a damn about them. My shareholders matter” and will migrate from Taiwan to China in 10 seconds.

商人會說:“維吾爾人????誰會在乎他們呢。我的股東才是最重要的”，并將在10秒內(nèi)從臺灣遷移到中國大陸

The US may try again and again but

美國人可能會一次又一次地嘗試，但是：

(a) They waited too long. China is too rich today. They have too much money.

他們會等得很久。今天的中國太富裕了。他們有太多的錢。

(b) China has too many tentacles in foreign countries. Thousands of Chinese in various industries who are experts.

中國在國外的觸角太多。數(shù)以千計的華人專家分布在各行各業(yè)。

In Space alone - China was behind India until 2010 - but today - they have their own Mapping System for their huge landmass as well as are in the position of becoming the Third country in the globe to land on Mars - having landed on the moon.

僅在太空方面——中國在2010年之前一直落后于印度——但今天——他們擁有自己的龐大陸地測繪系統(tǒng)，并處于成為全球第三個登陸火星的國家的位置——已經(jīng)登陸了月球。

China and Russia are on the verge of building their own International Space Station having both the financial muscle and technology.

中國和俄羅斯即將建立自己的國際空間站，他們既有財力又有技術(shù)。

You cannot bully or intimidate or stifle Progress. Eventually Life finds a way.

你們不能靠欺凌、恐嚇或扼殺進步。最終，生活找到了一條路。

US should learn this lesson hard. The more they try - they may get 10 years more but in the end China will get there and take over.

美國應(yīng)該好好吸取教訓(xùn)。他們嘗試得越多——他們可能最晚在十年內(nèi)達到同等的技術(shù)并接管整個市場。

It might be quite awhile, but there are many variables that’s in play.

這可能需要一段時間，但有很多變數(shù)在發(fā)揮作用。

It should be noted that NO country at this point can produce the ASML EUV equipment on its own (or even the older generation DUV is questionable), ASML relies heavily on suppliers from Germany / UK / US / Japan etc as well to make their equipment, Japan might be the closest country that can produce a similar (but older generation) equipment relying only on company / tech inside their border.

需要注意的是，目前沒有哪個國家可以自己生產(chǎn)ASML的EUV設(shè)備(甚至老一代的DUV也值得懷疑)，ASML嚴(yán)重依賴德國/英國/美國/日本等國的供應(yīng)商來生產(chǎn)他們的設(shè)備，日本可能是最接近能夠生產(chǎn)類似(但老一代)設(shè)備的國家，只依賴本國的公司/技術(shù)。

As of right now the ASML not selling highest-end EUV to China isn’t even really a thing, because they can’t produce enough of them anyway, and the whole project managed to get off the ground because Intel / TSMC / Samsung funded the project SPECIFICALLY so that ASML only really sells to them that machine. it’s not just SMIC of China that can’t buy it, even global foundery of the world can’t either.

就目前而言，ASML不向中國銷售[敏感詞]規(guī)格的EUV還算不上什么，因為他們無論如何都無法生產(chǎn)足夠多的EUV，而且整個項目成功地啟動了，因為英特爾/臺積電/三星專門資助了這個項目，所以ASML只向他們出售那臺機器。不只是中國的中芯國際買不到它，就連全球鑄造廠也買不到。

There are many layers of problems to China building it’s own extreme ultraviolet lithography machines, but the most difficult is the fact that EUV and the way TSMC & Samsung uses them are the extreme edge of precision engineering and manufacturing. something China has never been particularly great at, for example, they still struggle so far to build their own internal combustion engines to the same level as Japan / Germany (the two key powerhouse players in doing such things.)

中國制造自己的極紫外光刻機存在許多層面的問題，但最困難的是EUV以及臺積電和三星使用它們的方式是精密工程和制造的[敏感詞]優(yōu)勢。中國在這方面從來都不是特別擅長，例如，到目前為止，他們?nèi)匀辉谂χ圃炫c日本/德國(這兩個關(guān)鍵的大國在做這類事情)相同的內(nèi)燃機。

There are certainly potential ways for China to reengineer the process and come up with something that has a relatively similar end result but relies on different technologies, however that would require them to completely reinvent the wheel of something that was basically the collaboration of the whole world over decades on their own. Again, that’s not IMPOSSIBLE, but it’s certainly extremely difficult and inefficient.

中國當(dāng)然有可能重新設(shè)計這一過程，并提出一些具有相對相似的最終結(jié)果，但依賴不同技術(shù)的東西，但這將需要他們完全重新發(fā)明輪子的東西，這基本上是整個世界在幾十年的合作，靠自己。同樣，這不是不可能的，但這肯定是極其困難和低效的。

Not to mention that this is not a purely scientific / engineering project, the difference with TSMC winning over other competitors is primarily COST. i.e that it’s not that Intel CAN’T do 7nm, they can, it’s that their failure rate is much higher than TSMC that if say, Apple relies only on Intel for their 7nm chip, they’ll have to sell their iphone at a much higher price and/or one of Intel or Apple (or both) go bankrupt.

且不說這不是一個純粹的科學(xué)/工程項目，臺積電與其他競爭對手的區(qū)別主要在于成本。也就是說，不是英特爾不能做7nm，而是他們可以，而是他們的失敗率比臺積電高得多，如果蘋果只依賴英特爾做他們的7nm芯片，他們將不得不以更高的價格出售他們的iphone和/或英特爾或蘋果(或兩者)之一破產(chǎn)。

So even if China COULD reverse engineer or re-engineer the EUV machine or subsititute, if it doesn’t actually win out on a cost basis it’s basically useless commercially, an insanely expensive academic project (we’re talking about NASA level funding.) most importantly, the US could simply shut out said machine using standards, and for local chinese companies like SMIC to adapt a different system would be extremely problematic.

因此，即使中國可以對EUV機器進行逆向工程或重新設(shè)計或替代，如果它在成本上沒有真正贏得勝利，它在商業(yè)上基本上是無用的，一個瘋狂昂貴的學(xué)術(shù)項目(我們說的是NASA水平的資金。)最重要的是，美國可以簡單地排除使用標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的機器，而對中國本土公司，如中芯國際適應(yīng)一個不同的系統(tǒng)將是非常有問題的。

Is it POSSIBLE if China just like nationalize SMIC and stuff? yeah, but it would in the grander scheme of things, be pretty close to cutting off your own nose to spit your enemy. China would effectively be abandoning the world market for decades in such a scenario. and probably move slower than their competitors.

如果中國把中芯國際國有化，可能嗎?沒錯，但從更大的角度來說，這就像是割下自己的鼻子來唾棄你的敵人。在這種情況下，中國實際上是在幾十年內(nèi)放棄世界市場。而且可能比他們的競爭對手行動更慢。

What China SHOULD do, is what they have been doing most of the time (some major exceptions of terrible mistakes and frauds non-withstanding.) which is to try and gradually move up the chain and establish more and more companies in this field and hope that some of them eventually hold a major niche that becomes almost indispensable in this field. I’d say that most of the actual workers / players in this field in China understands this and is more or less trying to do that.

中國應(yīng)該做的，是他們在大多數(shù)時候一直在做的(盡管存在一些嚴(yán)重的錯誤和欺詐)，那就是嘗試并逐步向上移動鏈條，在這個領(lǐng)域建立越來越多的公司，并希望其中一些公司最終在這個領(lǐng)域占據(jù)一個幾乎不可或缺的主要利基。我想說的是，中國這個領(lǐng)域的大多數(shù)實際工作者/參與者都明白這一點，并或多或少地試圖這樣做。

But just to remind people, semi conductor’s main raw material input is Silicon

但提醒大家一下，半導(dǎo)體的主要原材料是硅。

So just to give an idea what shutting out China REALLY looks like.

所以，讓我們看看把中國拒之門外到底是什么樣子。

Now that’s the part on why it’s a major problem for China, the other side of the coin is that the US is increasingly playing a dangerous game as well and could blow up its own advantages or worse.

這就是為什么它是中國的一個主要問題，硬幣的另一面是，美國也在越來越多地玩一個危險的游戲，可能會摧毀自己的優(yōu)勢，甚至更糟。

If you’re ASML and the EU in general, you’re not exactly thrilled to basically have the US policy forced upon you as well. and would probably now actively think about having replacement tech for the US/UK stuff if possible so that you have at least political and economic independence (i.e even if they don’t sell to China, it’s on their terms and not because the US commanded them to do so.) and once that happens the next potential moves by US and others could become quite scary.

如果你是ASML和歐盟，你不會因為美國的政策強加給你而感到興奮。如果可能的話，現(xiàn)在可能會積極考慮擁有替代美國/英國產(chǎn)品的技術(shù)，這樣你至少有政治和經(jīng)濟獨立(也就是說，即使他們不賣給中國，這是根據(jù)他們的條件，而不是因為美國命令他們這么做)，一旦發(fā)生這種情況，美國和其他國家的下一個潛在舉動可能會變得非常可怕。

It should be generally noted that the EU and other US allies is actually paying almost all the price for the trade war/ geopolitical struggle with China / Russia while the US is benefitting at their expense.

需要指出的是，歐盟和美國的其他盟友實際上為與中國/俄羅斯的貿(mào)易付出了幾乎所有的代價，而美國卻從他們的損失中受益。

( One easy prediction, there will be a major famine crisis in Africa / Middle East next few years, and will result in another refugee crisis that might make the last one look mundane. )

(一個簡單的預(yù)測是，未來幾年在非洲/中東將會有一場嚴(yán)重的饑荒危機，并將導(dǎo)致另一場難民危機，這可能會讓上一場危機顯得平淡無奇。)

So far if one look at the score board it’s pretty much the US wins and everyone else (friend or foe) loses with a few small exceptions.

到目前為止，如果你看一下記分牌，基本上美國贏嘛了，其他所有人(朋友或敵人)都輸了，只有一些小的例外。

This is clearly unsustainable over the long term, and it’s not like this is just happening as a new thing, the general trend has been on-going since at least the early 2000s and not only have the likes of China and Russia been making obvious contingency plans, one would be naive to think that the EU is just a pure puppet with no independent thought or interest apart from the US.

從長期來看，這顯然是不可持續(xù)的，這并不是一件新鮮事，至少從21世紀(jì)初開始，這種大趨勢就一直在持續(xù)，不僅中國和俄羅斯等國一直在制定明顯的應(yīng)急計劃，人們會天真地認為歐盟只是一個純粹的傀儡，除了美國之外沒有獨立的思想或利益。

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